End a member's sessions in the org
For a lost laptop or a token that may have leaked: from now, a Synq access token from a sign-in before now acts in this org no more, the dashboard's, the CLI's and an AI agent's (MCP host's) alike, and each answers 403 `fresh_sign_in_required` saying so. The member stays a member: once they sign in again, they work here as before, and an app or agent they connected before now needs connecting again. Their sessions in their other orgs are theirs and stay. The setup codes they made in the org stop working, and the change requests their agents asked for that wait on them are cancelled. Removing a member, or their leaving, ends all of this at once without this call: every request checks membership. API keys belong to the org, not to whoever made them, and keep working either way: revoke one they hold the secret of. Not the owner's, but by the owner. Needs `org.members.edit`, and nobody ends the sessions of someone who can do more than they can. Recorded as `member.sessions_ended`.
/v1/orgs/{org}/members/{user}/end-sessionsFor a lost laptop or a token that may have leaked: from now, a Synq access token from a sign-in before now acts in this org no more, the dashboard's, the CLI's and an AI agent's (MCP host's) alike, and each answers 403 fresh_sign_in_required saying so. The member stays a member: once they sign in again, they work here as before, and an app or agent they connected before now needs connecting again. Their sessions in their other orgs are theirs and stay. The setup codes they made in the org stop working, and the change requests their agents asked for that wait on them are cancelled.
Removing a member, or their leaving, ends all of this at once without this call: every request checks membership. API keys belong to the org, not to whoever made them, and keep working either way: revoke one they hold the secret of.
Not the owner's, but by the owner. Needs org.members.edit, and nobody ends the sessions of someone who can do more than they can. Recorded as member.sessions_ended.
Authorization
bearer An org API key (sk_live_…, sk_test_…), or an access token from the Synq issuer (the synq brand, on the accounts host) for this API.
In: header
Path Parameters
The org's id
^org_[0-9a-hjkmnp-tv-z]{26}$The member's user id at Synq
^usr_[0-9a-hjkmnp-tv-z]{26}$Request Body
application/json
TypeScript Definitions
Use the request body type in TypeScript.
Response Body
application/json
application/problem+json
application/problem+json
application/problem+json
application/problem+json
application/problem+json
curl -X POST "https://api.synq.build/v1/orgs/org_01h455vb4pex5vsknk084sn02q/members/usr_01h455vb4pex5vsknk084sn02q/end-sessions" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SYNQ_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{}'{ "sessions_ended_at": "2026-10-21T12:00:00.000Z", "setup_codes_ended": 0, "change_requests_cancelled": 0}Change a member's role PATCH
Their role across the org, their brand roles, or both; a new role alone gives that role's brand roles (Brand admin on All brands for an admin, Viewer for a member, none for billing). Not the owner's, who is Brand admin in every brand, and never to owner: ownership is handed over. At most the caller's own permissions, across the org and in each brand. A role in one brand wants a plan with roles in one brand at a time (403 `plan_feature_unavailable`, Scale and up); All brands is on every plan. Needs `org.members.edit`. Recorded as `member.role_assigned`, with the brand roles.
Read whether you hid a notice of your own GET
Whether the calling person hid `notice` for themselves on the pages about no org in Synq's dashboard, such as `add_passkey`, the "Add a passkey" to-do on their account’s page, and when. A person's credential only.